Farah Ramin; Aleme Allami; Seyyedeh Mona Mousavi
Abstract
William Rowe presents a new understanding of the evidential problem of evil based on his own epistemic principle, which states that "the truth of a proposition is not a necessary ...
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William Rowe presents a new understanding of the evidential problem of evil based on his own epistemic principle, which states that "the truth of a proposition is not a necessary condition for its rational acceptance." He proposes the theory of "friendly atheism" and defends the rationality of belief in God through "epistemic friendliness." However, forty years later, he revisits this theory and only believes in “ethical friendliness”. In this study, through an analytical-critical method, we aim to evaluate the theory of friendly atheism - epistemological or moral - and its challenges. The findings show that despite the ambiguity in the meaning of rationality in the epistemic principle, "epistemic friendliness" in affirming the evidence for and against God is paradoxical and faces relativism in rationality, and the theory of incomplete determination cannot justify this dilemma. ethical friendliness is a normative approach dedicated to the behavior of atheists and seems to weaken the rationality of the theory and can be considered as a form of new atheism that requires weakening belief in God.
